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Introduction 
 
In the past few decades state corporate income tax policy and 
coordination/harmonization of corporate income taxes have been regularly discussed in 
the tax policy literature. The reason for this level of attention is that capital is assumed to 
be highly mobile across nations or unions with multiple jurisdictions with differential 
corporate tax rates (Bucovetsky, 1991; Cnossen, 2003; Frey & Eichenberger, 1996; 
Gordon, 1983; Isard, 1990; Keen & Marchand, 1997). Further, much of the literature 
focuses on states’  “race to the bottom” in terms of corporate income taxation or 
incentives to base capital in their jurisdictions, and the tendency for this race/competition 
to cause inefficient levels of public services to be provided (Black & Hoyt, 1989; 
Bucovetsky, 1991; Edwards & Keen, 1995; Frey & Eichenberger, 1996; Keen & 
Marchand, 1997; Oates, 1972; Rushton 2000; Wilson, 1995, 1999). This has mainly to do 
with the fact that reductions in corporate income tax levels lower the revenues of local 
governments in a union or federal republic, though reliance on this revenue source varies 
across jurisdictions (Cnossen, 2003; Gordon, & Wilson, 1986; Wildasin, 1999; Zodrow, 
2003).   
 Though most of the literature has focused on the inefficiencies caused by tax 
competition, more recent literature has taken an opposite or more neutral stance on the 
subject. Multiple scholars have found either inconclusive or positive benefits to tax 
coordination (Bovenberg, Cnossen & De Mooij, 2003;; Rounds, 1992; Wilson, 1995; 
Wilson & Wildasin, 2003, Zodrow, 2003).  This paper synthesizes the current literature 
on the subject of state corporate tax policy and takes an empirical approach to determine 
what in fact drives the way in which states set corporate tax policy. Further, this paper 
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will take an empirical approach to understand what forces create an impetus for change 
and which do not. This paper departs from the literature insofar as it looks at the 
determinants of state corporate tax policy as opposed to its consequences by looking at a 
number of variables from the 50 U.S. states. I propose that while tax competition is an 
important factor, a more straightforward answer to this question exists. That being that 
political considerations, in particular budgetary policy, are also important determinants of 
state corporate tax policy. The main questions to be answered in this analysis are: Do 
states adopt corporate tax rates adopted in nearby or geographically proximate states? 
Do states adopt corporate tax policies adopted by states with more similar 
characteristics? Do states consider a combination of the two? Or, do states choose a 
corporate tax policy with no regard to other states? Are there factors other than 
competition which drive changes in state corporate tax policy in a more direct fashion? 
 
Background on State Corporate Tax Policy: Coordination & Competition 
 
Tax Coordination/Harmonization 
 
Rounds (1992) defines harmonization as “any situation where differences in 
taxation between the states (or provinces) are reduced either by cooperation among the 
states or by a federal government policy”. Tax coordination/harmonization deals with the 
ability of governments across jurisdictions in a union to coordinate or harmonize 
corporate tax rates so as to optimize local revenues, while simultaneously attracting 
capital to and preventing outflows or cross-hauling of capital out of their jurisdiction ( 
Bucovetsky, 1991; Frey & Eichenberger, 1996; Gordon & Wilson, 1986). This is 
especially important in unions where local jurisdictions have a great deal of discretion 
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over corporate tax rate levels (Wildasin, 1999). In a Federal system of government each 
jurisdiction has independent choice as to what tax rate will be chosen, as well as what 
level of public goods will be provided (Gordon, 1983). This distinction however, does not 
apply only to Federal systems but to multijurisdictional contexts in general. 
Kanbur & Keen (1993) recall the similarities between a federal system of 
government, in terms of tax coordination/harmonization, and political and/or economic 
unions, such as the European Union (EU), and even go so far as to include international 
tax issues. The reasons for these similarities are the underlying difficulties and benefits of 
this type of cooperation. The EU has faced many of the same problems as federal states 
throughout the course of its history, though contexts and constraints are somewhat 
different; similarities are nevertheless significant (Cnossen, 2003; Edwards & Keen, 
1996; Kanbur & Keen, 1993; Keen & Marchand, 1997; Zodrow, 2003).   
Differences in tax rates become important not only for the harmonization or 
coordination of said rates but also for the competition it creates among jurisdictions. 
There are at least two ways of looking at tax coordination/harmonization from a reading 
of the literature. The first approach is to examine it as a means of providing a uniform tax 
rate across all member jurisdictions or to have a tax-revenue sharing whereby the federal 
(or supranational) government collects all tax revenues and each state then receives a 
percentage of those revenues be it by formula apportionment or other mechanism.  The 
second approach is to agree explicitly to a certain tax rate but still allow for  differing 
levels among the jurisdictions but with one caveat; change of the agreed upon levels takes 
place only through official or explicit agreement (Gordon, 1983; Isard, 1990; Rounds; 
1992; Wildasin, 2002; Zodrow; 2003).  
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 Competition in the form of corporate tax rates causes capital to move to areas 
where profitability will be its highest, i.e. where the tax rate is lowest, thereby having a 
positive effect on the jurisdiction receiving the capital, but a negative one the jurisdiction 
losing it. Black & Hoyt, (1989), model competition in this way and show that it may 
actually facilitate efficient locating of capital. Further, Wilson (1995) clearly states that 
while capital outflows which are caused by differential tax rates are seen as a cost from 
the point of view of a single jurisdiction, they are not seen as one from the viewpoint of 
the economy as a whole. We are reminded, however, that while harmonization does make 
administration, and economic and political interaction easier, there are still trade-offs 
with real winners and losers. Brochner, Jensen, Svensson & Sorensen, (2006), find 
evidence of this fact in their study on the EU and its member states. The also find that 
aggregate welfare gains may be only modest at best.  Bucovetsky (1991), Gordon & 
Wilson, (1986) and Kanbur & Keen (1993) have all produced models which show that 
tax structures are in fact under pressure due to competition amongst multiple jurisdictions 
and that size does matter. The models they utilize provide evidence that tax competition 
does exist. Therefore, this force is a necessary one to consider when analyzing the 
determinants of state corporate tax policy. However, only through a thorough search for 
each agreement which may exist between states, is it possible to determine what levels of 
state corporate tax coordination or harmonization take place.  
 
Tax Competition  
Due to competition amongst individual governments or jurisdictions the need for 
and lack of coordination/harmonization of tax policies among jurisdictions has become 
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an item of considerable interest (Cnossen, 2003; Edwards & Keen, 1996; Kanbur & 
Keen, 1993; Rounds, 1992;  Rushton, 2000; Wildasin, 2002; Zodrow, 2003).  The reason 
this is important in the overall context of state corporate tax policy is that tax competition 
has recently led many scholars to conclude that tax coordination and competition have 
ambiguous effects on jurisdictions especially given contextual problems and model-
specific variations (Bovenberg, Cnossen and De Mooij, 2003; Edwards & Keen, 1996; 
Rounds, 1992; Wilson 1999; Wilson & Wildasin, 2004; Zodrow, 2003). Wilson and 
Wildasin (2004) define tax competition as: “Noncooperative tax setting by independent 
governments, under which each government’s policy choices influence the allocation of a 
mobile tax base among ‘regions’ represented by these governments.”  Given this 
interpretation one might think that tax competition could be modeled well utilizing game-
theory to explain how states would act in a number of non-cooperative games where one 
state or actor has the first move and the second state or actor responds to this. One would 
expect less than social optimality given these conditions.  
 Again, while no consensus exists about the effects which tax competition has or 
creates there are at least three models which underpin the majority of the writings and/or 
studies and which serve as the foundation for the bulk of extensions and applications of 
new models. Tiebout (1956) in his influential work, created a theory of what in essence 
was an efficient theory of tax competition. His main argument was that taxes had to 
remain at a level which was equal to the cost of providing the individual taxpayer with 
public services at the margin. In essence his model was one where taxpayers voted with 
their feet. They chose regions in which the marginal benefits and marginal cost of 
taxation were equal. This extends to corporate tax policy in that capital is considered to 
 5
by mobile, thereby making capital allocation mobile, much like voters in Tiebout’s 
model. Therefore, tax competition causes efficient relocating of capital in this model. 
This would imply that tax competition for mobile factors including, people and capital is 
beneficial.  
Oates (1972) took a contrary position on the issue of tax competition. He 
suggested that taxes are kept too low in order to attract investment and as a result, this 
leads to under provision of public services or goods. He further argued that as 
jurisdictions competed with one another that none could obtain a competitive advantage 
and this would lead to a “race to the bottom”. Continuing from there it is quite simple to 
see that competition would serve to make jurisdictions worse off than before. In other 
words, tax competition, in his view, is not beneficial but rather detrimental.  
Zodrow & Mieszkowski (1986) & Wilson (1986) were some of the first scholars 
to model and explain tax competition’s negative effects. Their models were not exactly 
the same, but nevertheless found approximately the same results and for the purposes of 
this paper we will focus on the ZM model and its implications for tax policy research. 
These two models assume that jurisdictions are symmetric where Nash equilibria are the 
norm. They also assume that each jurisdiction is too small to affect the overall national 
variables. Due to these limitations Bucovetsky (1991) and Wilson (1995) both carried out 
studies assuming asymmetry between jurisdictions and still find that tax competition with 
asymmetric jurisdictions causes under-provision of public output. Further, Wilson (1999) 
explains that the central message of the tax competition literature up to this point was to 
show that “independent governments engage in wasteful competition for scarce capital 
through reductions in tax rates and public expenditure level.” (Black & Hoyt, 1989; 
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Edwards & Keen, 1996; Gordon & Wilson, 1986; Rounds, 1992; Rushton, 2000; Wilson, 
1995, 1999; Wilson & Wildasin, 2004; Zodrow, 2003).  
It becomes clear from these studies and models that if coordination or 
harmonization does not exist on some level there is a tendency for jurisdictions to 
compete or offer incentives for capital to locate in their jurisdiction. This earlier literature 
assumed that this competition caused a number of inefficiencies, including under-
provision of public services which in some cases cause reductions in programs intended 
to redistribute income to the poor, misallocation of capital, and inefficiently low tax rates. 
However, while much focus was placed on the inefficiencies, little attention was focused 
on the political determinants of state corporate tax policy insofar as how it was 
determined and what, other than competition, might be driving this. 
About the same time, though still focused on consequences, the literature was 
turning towards an understanding of the potential beneficial effects of tax competition. 
Wilson and Wildasin (2004) suggest that the previous theories are not as clear and do not 
have unambiguous effects in every case.  The most prominent effects cited include the 
ability of competition to limit government size, or in other words, limit the growth of the 
public sector and also the ability to pressure governments into becoming more efficient 
and responsive (Black & Hoyt, 1989; Gordon & Wilson, 1986; Rounds, 1992; Rushton, 
2000; Wilson, 1995, 1999; Wilson & Wildasin, 2004; Zodrow, 2003). Edwards & Keen 
(1996) model this specific idea using the ZM model as a basis. They find that competition 
should be set aside and coordination accepted only if the efficiency gains outweigh the 
policy-makers propensity to waste. In this case, at least for the current case, this could 
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manifest itself in the budgetary process, or changes in political ideology of decision 
makers.  
Further evidence shows that in some cases tax competition may have other 
previously unknown benefits. The reasons for this include arguments such as efficient 
allocation of capital, reduction in the size of government, encouragement of competing 
governments to limit wasteful spending, considerations of tax rates levied in other 
jurisdictions, and, finally, welfare gains from competition for mobile firms as outlined 
before in the Tiebout Hypothesis (1956; Cnossen, 2003; Oates, 1972; Rounds, 1992; 
Rushton, 2000; Wildasin, 2002; Wilson, 1999; Wilson and Wildasin, 2004; Zodrow, 
2003).   
  Tax competition has at least two aspects:  implicit competition where 
jurisdictions lower or limit tax rates in an effort to keep resources and/or economic 
activity from leaving to other jurisdictions (tax-bases); and explicit competition where 
jurisdictions actively compete with the goal or intention of attracting economic activity 
and/or resources to their tax base (Edwards & Keen, 1996; Oates, 1972; Rounds, 1992; 
Rushton 2000, Wilson, 1995). When considering the EU or international tax competition 
it is that which exists instead between member states (independent nations) as opposed to 
state governments as in the United States or other federal republics but the issues in the 
EU and the US are strikingly similar.   
Again, Wilson (1999) outlines the contrasting nature of tax competition insofar as 
it relates to efficient output of public goods or local services. On one hand, horizontal 
intergovernmental tax competition was for the most part, seen as mostly wasteful and 
potentially leading to misallocation of capital, as well as possibly causing jurisdictions to 
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provide less than efficient levels of public services. Finally, some theoretical studies have 
shown that tax competition can cause suboptimal tax rates across jurisdictions (tax 
bases). This would cause taxes to be higher than usual for the population (Cnossen, 2003; 
Oates, 1972: Rushton, 2000; Wilson, 1999; Wilson and Wildasin, 2004; Zodrow, 2003).   
Though both sides of the argument are considered at this point the literature gives an 
ambiguous answer in terms of tax competition’s beneficial or negative effects 
conclusively, and does little to incorporate political processes, such as budgetary 
processes or political ideologies of citizens and/ or institutions in a jurisdiction into the 
models. 
 
Jurisdictional Authority  
 
 Corporate taxes constitute an important type of revenue generation for both 
subnational and supranational governments (federal or otherwise), though, as mentioned 
before, the level of dependence on this type of revenue varies across jurisdictions, 
especially in the U.S. (Wildasin, 1999). Many uncertainties make the concept of tax 
coordination/harmonization across federal republics, regions such as the EU, and 
internationally not only economically difficult, but politically and administratively 
difficult as well. This is mainly because jurisdictional authority to tax is not always clear. 
This is especially true for corporations located in multiple jurisdictions (Gordon & 
Wilson, 1986; Wildasin, 1999, 2002). For a jurisdiction to impose a corporation income 
tax, it must first establish that the corporation is in fact subject to taxes levied by the 
jurisdiction. Though not of vital importance to the current study, the jurisdictional 
question, especially in the U.S., is a particularly interesting matter now under 
consideration.  
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Policy and Institutional Design 
 
Rounds (1992) explains how U.S. policy and institutional design differ from most 
other federal republics in considerable ways. The attitude toward tax competition and in 
particular state corporate tax policy in the U.S. stems from the fact that many state 
governments were financially independent from the federal government for over 120 
years and presently still have a great deal of fiscal independence. The general consensus 
is that the federal government should not intervene in regional development, in this case 
the setting of corporate income tax rates (Rounds, 1992, Wildasin, 1999.) Another, 
considerable distinction is that the Constitution is relatively silent on this issue, which 
leaves many questions for future decision-makers. However, there is one exception: the 
Constitution does make special inference in regards to the ability of state fiscal policies 
and the fact that they can and should not interfere with interstate commerce (Wildasin, 
1999).   
 The U.S. unlike other federal republics does not look towards equalization or 
general-revenue grants to lessen the impacts of tax competition. The U.S maintains a 
tradition of state domination of local development. In other words, when it comes to 
taxation the U.S. allows states to determine their own corporate tax rate independently 
(Rounds, 1992, Wildasin, 1999, 2002).  When both the state and federal governments 
impose a tax on the same tax base, this is known as vertical competition.  Horizontal 
competition occurs when taxes are competed for across states or jurisdictions.  Both of 
these cases illustrate the interest by some scholars for harmonization, or at least 
coordination, both among the states and with the federal government (Wilson, 1999). 
Still, it is necessary to remember that most countries lie somewhere between perfect 
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harmonization and perfect competition. For some it is not necessary for rates to be 
equalized or for there to be no competition but rather an optimal level of coordination, 
though it may be difficult to state what that particular level that might be (Isard, 1990; 
Rounds, 1992).   
 States are limited by federal statues and Supreme Court decisions as to how they 
can tax corporate income. The majority of states are members of the Multistate Tax 
Commission (MTC).  Though membership is high, states are not required to follow the 
three-factor formula set forth by the commission (Wildasin, 2002).  Another aspect for 
consideration is that an important mechanism for increasing tax harmonization is the 
federal tax deduction for state income taxes or the double taxation convention. These 
assist in lowering interstate income tax disparities (Rounds, 1992, Wilson, 1999).  
 Gordon & Wilson (1986) explain how state governments tax a multistate firm 
through the use of formula apportionment. The main way of achieving this is through the 
use of the Multistate Tax Corporation’s (MTC) three-factor formula. While a guideline 
exists which is calculated using weighted averages of a corporation’s payroll, capital 
assets and sales, this three-factor formula is not used by all states.  More and more, states 
are using the sales portion of the formula as the main weight to determine taxing 
authority in their jurisdictions (Wildasin, 2002, 1999; Rounds, 1992). As stated 
previously, the fact that the U.S. allows states a large amount of discretion in regards to 
corporate tax policy is also a factor which should be considered. But, it is still important 
to take into account that the federal government, while allowing considerable discretion 
to the states, still levies a much higher tax level. Most states levy a rate of less than 10% 
whereas at the federal level it is around 35% (Wildasin, 2002, 1999). 
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Data 
 The data for this analysis will come from a number of sources including the U.S 
Census Bureau, the National Conference of State Legislatures and the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis. The model will take into account at least three types of variables. 
The variables are separated in to political, economic and demographic characteristics. 
States are classified by region as outlined by the U.S. Census Bureau.  The years which 
will be considered are the years 2001-2007 with just two values of general fund 
allocation missing. Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics. All explanatory variables 
are lagged relative to corporate tax rates, 2001-2007, or to say the same thing another 
way, tax rates are stated as a lead.    
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Tax_rate_next year (lead) 350 6.056 2.627 0 10 
Genl.Fund Allocation  (millions) 398 10.030 12.582 .491 91.592 
Population (millions) 400 5.074 6.265 0 36.250 
White % 400 82.258 12.040 28.6 96.7 
Female % 400 50.634 .718 48.3 51.6 
Population Under_18 % 400 23.96 2.871 7.8 31 
Population 18-64 % 400 12.536 7.852 5 62.4 
Population  Over 65 % 400 12.656 1.676 6.8 16.8 
Census Division (Fixed Effects) 400 5.12 2.538 1 9 
Citizen Ideology 400 49.807 15.399 8.45 95.972 
Institutional Ideology (Party) 400 46.518 26.568 0 97.5 
 
All variables for the analysis are separated in to categories including political, economic 
and demographic. I will explain how each variable is calculated by variable type. 
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Political variables include party control of the legislature (Institutional ideology) and 
citizen ideology (Citizen ideology) and Census Division of which there are nine. The 
index scores are specified utilizing a political ideology index as outlined by Berry, 
Rinquist, Fording & Hanson (1998) and data obtained from Richard C. Fording’s website 
at http://www.uky.edu/~rford/Home for the current date data. The index scores both state 
and citizen ideology on a 0 to 100 point basis where 0 is the most conservative and 100 
the most liberal. This measure offers an especially good measurement because of the 
differences that exist within the same parties. This variable is important because those 
controlling the legislature and the overall conservatism/liberalism of the citizenry might 
have a direct impact on the way the corporate tax rate is perceived. 
Geographic Region/ Division, as stipulated by the U.S. Census Bureau, is considered 
in this case a political variable because I believe it might play an important role in that 
certain regions may share more similarities or important political characteristics. The 
Census Bureau has four official Regions West, Midwest, South and Northeast. For the 
purposes of this paper the states will be separated into the nine official Census Divisions: 
Pacific, Mountain, West North Central, West South Central, East South Central, East 
North Central, South Atlantic, Middle Atlantic, and New England. Regions are quite 
broad encompassing states with substantial differences. Therefore, I chose a less 
aggregated approach with a Division as the largest aggregation as opposed to the larger 
Census Region. This might also tell us whether Division space shows diffusion or 
competition among states considered to be regional neighbors or to share similar 
characteristics due to proximity such as political ideology or budgetary processes. 
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Economic variables include State Government General Fund Allocations, which is 
missing for Kentucky in 2002 and 2004, the only variable missing in any year, and 
Average State Corporate Tax Rate in the coming year, which is defined as a lead to avoid 
contemporaneous endogeneity. Total state government fund allocations allow a way to 
calculate the changes in government expenditures as the corporate tax rates changes. This 
measure is in millions of dollars. This also allows for the analysis to focus on state 
allocations not total allocations which include funds from other sources. Further, state 
general fund allocations tell us what spending level the legislature in each state considers 
important.  
In this analysis the dependent variable is the level of mean corporate income tax 
levels as a percentage based on levels year by year. The levels were calculated by 
summing all of the statutory corporate tax rates and dividing by the number of levels 
which exist. This information was obtained from the Bureau for Economic Analysis’s 
website directly. The rate policy adopted by states allows for one to compare the changes 
in tax rate policy. Due to the number of different marginal tax rates the average will be 
used in cases where multiple levels are stated. This is by no means an exact 
measurement; however for the sake of analysis a simple approach has been utilized in 
order to operationalize this variable and to determine changes in corporate tax rates 
across years and between states. Note that many caveats exist for items such as federal 
deductibility and income replacement, just to name a few. Changes in state corporate tax 
rates are not common.  Of 350 state-years, 318 show no change, 20 show a reduction, and 
12 show an increase.  The mean change is slightly and statistically insignificantly 
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positive, about 0.01% per state-year.  This prevents state fixed effects from being 
allowed, with so few changes to consider. 
The only demographic variables included here is Total Population of the State in 
millions (Pop_mill) as measured by the U.S. Census Bureau estimates in millions of 
people. The total population of a state is an important variable to measure both the ability 
of the state to provide both a workforce and the division of state GDP.  
 
Methods and Hypotheses  
The proposed study of this article is to model corporate tax rate setting policy as a 
function of nearby or similar state corporate tax rate setting policy. Furthermore, I will 
consider other relevant characteristics of the states. The method which will be employed 
is a cross sectional time series with Census Division fixed-effects. Here the model will be 
adapted in order to determine corporate tax diffusion policy across the states and changes 
in the corporate tax rate as well but will also include political variables including 
ideology indices for both institutions and citizens as well as state general fund allocations 
as a proxy for budgetary policy.  The model in this case is one in which corporate tax 
rates in the next year are a function of general fund allocations (millions), populations 
(millions), the Census Division (1-9), and finally the ideologies of the citizens and the 
ideology of the institutions (party in control of the legislature).  
The questions which I hope to answer through this analysis are: Do states adopt 
corporate tax rate policy adopted in nearby or geographically proximate state? Do states 
adopt corporate tax policies adopted by states with more similar characteristics? Do 
states consider a combination of the two? Or, do states choose a corporate tax policy 
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with no regard to other states? And most importantly, are changes in corporate tax rates 
better determined by factors other than competition?  These questions, while seemingly 
narrowly focused to a particular policy issue, might in fact be generalizable to other 
policy areas. This analysis may be the foundation which would allow for further 
prediction of state policy competition and potentially diffusion across a number of policy 
areas and issues.  
 This analysis will help clarify the relationship states maintain, either explicitly or 
implicitly with other states in the adoption of corporate tax policy and whether similar 
political ideologies or budgetary policies matter. The fact that some states do not have a 
corporate tax policy will not affect the analysis because this is in fact a strong tax policy. 
The main hypothesis is that: 
 
H1: While tax competition is an important factor changes in budgetary policy measured 
here as state general fund allocations are a better determinant of what types of changes 
might be seen in state corporate tax policy.  
 
If this hypothesis holds, a general model concerning state corporate tax policy might be 
in sight or at the least might provide insight into how states determine what tax rate 
should be chosen.   
 
Results 
 
This paper at the beginning speaks to the fact that tax competition drives how 
states develop or implement policy regarding corporate income taxes. Utilizing Census 
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Division and coding them 1 through 9 depending on region, I expected to find that states 
which shared a census region would be more likely to look to neighbors in their region 
when choosing a tax rate. Table 2 tells us which states are included in each Census 
Division. 
Table 2: Census Divisions and States 
 
Div: 1 New 
England 
2 Mid. 
Atlantic 
3 East 
N.Ctrl 
4 West N. 
Ctrl 
5 S. Atl 6 East 
S.Ctrl 
7 West 
S.Ctrl 
8 Mntn. 9 Pac. 
States CT, ME, 
MA, NH, 
RI, VT 
NJ, NY, 
PA 
IN, IL, MI, 
OH, WI 
IA, KS, 
MN, 
MO, NE, 
ND, SD 
DE, 
DC, FL, 
GA, 
MD, 
NC, SC, 
VA, 
WV 
AL, TN, 
KY, MS 
AR, 
LA, 
TX, 
OK 
AZ, NM, 
ID, CO, 
MT, NV, 
WY, UT 
AK, HI, 
CA, OR, 
WA, 
 
An Ordinary Least Squares regression was utilized including the same dependent 
variable (next years average corporate tax rate) but only including general fund 
allocations, population, census division fixed effects, and citizen and party ideology to 
estimate the effect of region and the other variables on corporate tax rates. Table 3 gives 
the results, which are heteroscedasticity consistent.  Region effects are relative to New 
England, the omitted category. 
 
Table 3: OLS Regression with Census Division 
Variable Coefficient Robust Std. Error 
GF Allocation  (millions) ***.087 .022 
Population (millions) ***-.121 .043 
Middle Atlantic ***-.123 .429 
South Atlantic ***-1.312 .322 
East North Central ***-2.139 .470 
West North Central ***-1.644 .504 
East South Central ***-2.453 .458 
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West South Central ***-4.024 .563 
Mountain ***-2.940 .464 
Pacific ***-3.474 .521 
Citizen Ideology  -.006 .011 
Institutional/ Legislature Ideology  ***.016 .016 
Constant ***7.350 .645 
N 348  
R-Squared .3325  
 
(***significance at the .01 level) 
After looking at the variables in the model, it seems that region is a highly 
important factor. The model controls for budget size, population, regional fixed effects 
and ideologies of both the citizenry and legislature of a state. Census divisions one and 
two which include the New England and Mid-Atlantic region have on average higher 
corporate tax rates than the other region. New England, the omitted category, has an 
effect set to zero, and Middle Atlantic has an effect statistically insignificantly different 
from zero; all others are statistically significantly negative. Further, regions seven and 
nine, which include West South Central and Pacific divisions are considerably lower than 
the other regions, by an estimated 4.0 and 3.5 percentage points, other things equal. The 
importance of region may exist for a number of reasons and to bring the discussion back 
to tax competition, it may be possible that regions matter because of the regions’ shared 
history, industry bases in the region and finally, along the lines of this analysis, because 
of local competition leading to local equilibria. Finally, the results also suggest that party 
ideology of the party in power in the legislature matters while citizen ideology does not. 
Higher scores are more liberal, associated with higher corporate tax rates.  Apparently, 
citizen ideology has little effect unless translated into ideology of the party in power.  The 
correlation between these two measures is 56.8%, large but far from perfect. 
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Higher General fund allocation decisions are associated with higher corporate tax 
rates in the following year. There could be endogeneity from other factors, but general 
fund allocations lag tax rates here. From the above table one sees that General fund 
allocations have statistically significant effects. Additionally, population shifts would be 
expected to change corporate tax rates, because governments must find a way to continue 
to provide particular service levels. So, for example, if a population shifted in time period 
one to a different jurisdiction due to the package of services the local government 
provides, and in time period two the government must now provide higher levels of 
services to this larger population, one would expect to see either expansion of tax base or 
higher tax rates or both depending on tax structure.  
 
Conclusion 
State corporate tax policy and its determinants are subjects which currently 
receive a great deal of attention. The literature, however, offers competition as a driving 
force but with at least one flaw: the lack of inclusion of political variables. Further, the 
literature is also ambiguous in regards to the effects of tax competition. Scholars are not 
certain whether competition creates benefits such as constraining growth of the public 
sector, creating efficient allocation of capital, and pressure for government to be more 
efficient and responsive (Black & Hoyt, 1989; Edwards & Keen, 1996; Gordon & 
Wilson, 1986; Rounds, 1992; Rushton, 2000; Wilson, 1995, 1999; Wilson & Wildasin, 
2004; Zodrow, 2003), or if it causes inefficient levels of public services to be provided 
and narrowing of the tax base (Black & Hoyt, 1989; Bovenber, Cnossen and De Mooij, 
2003; Bucovetsky, 1991; Cnossen, 2003; Edwards & Keen, 1995; Frey & Eichenberger, 
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1996; Gordon, 1983; Keen & Marchand, 1997; Oates, 1972; Rushton 2000; Wilson, 
1995, 1999). Many of the models which currently exist in the literature, while very 
useful, are quite limited in the information which they provide, insofar as how effective 
either competition or coordination and harmonization can be (Bovenberg, Cnossen and 
De Mooij, 2003; Edwards & Keen, 1996; Rounds, 1992; Wilson 1999; Wilson & 
Wildasin, 2004; Zodrow, 2003) and also whether or not political processes, something 
Wilson & Wildasin (2004) identified, and ideology matter directly.   
Considering the political underpinnings of the subject, it is extremely interesting 
to see that scholars have only considered the effects of competition and coordination and 
modeled said effects repeatedly, but have failed to explore the reasons for non-
coordination, negotiation or competition in terms of a policy process, shared political 
characteristics or shared jurisdictional political ideologies. The purpose of this paper is to 
draw out empirical evidence supporting which determinants are important. Tax policy is 
an inherently economic issue affected strongly by political processes. Ideology matters, 
but apparently more in the ideology of the party in power than in the ideology of the 
population.  These are correlated (57.8% in the data here), but not close to perfectly, and 
the estimation attributes much more effect to party ideology. 
The results of this analysis suggest that while tax competition is certainly an 
important determinant of state corporate tax policy, local actors or policy makers may 
also be focusing more on local problems. Budgetary considerations and the need to find 
revenue for new or existing programs may be manifested in higher corporate tax rates. In 
other words, depending on the timing of both, as budgetary policy is considered by 
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decision-makers, the result of needed changes to existing financing levels means that 
corporate incomes are taxed at a higher rate or vice versa. 
Another result of this paper is that changes in population also seem to have an 
effect on the level of corporate tax rates. The inverse relationship of the result suggests 
that as populations fall the corporate income tax rises. This seems logical at least in one 
sense given that as populations exit a jurisdiction then revenues must be made-up in other 
places e.g. the corporate income tax. While a basic analysis this paper offers some insight 
into the political processes which take place around state decisions on setting corporate 
tax rates. Further research might include analysis of the actual budgetary processes 
included in determining general fund allocations and how these interactions affect 
corporate income tax levels.  
Region, as specified by Census Division, is a highly important determinant. 
Regions differ considerably in the level of corporate tax rates chosen. Additionally, the 
reasons for these differences include shared history, industry base, and perhaps local 
competition which has led to local equilibria. After conducting this analysis, one thing 
becomes very clear; tax competition is still an important determinant insofar as corporate 
taxes are concerned. However, states consider their general fund allocations as well as 
population shifts when determining how to set corporate tax policy.  
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